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Colander Testimony On Risks Modeling

Last September, the Committee on Science and Technology's Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, a subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives heard testimony on the risks of financial modeling. I looked at David Colander's testimony.

Colander advocates modeling economies as complex dynamical systems. He thinks economists should be aware of the limitations of models. Macroeconomists, in settling on the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, failed to consider a wide range of models. The assumptions of the DSGE model do not fit the real world. (In objecting to the use of the "assumption" of the existence of a representative agent, I am on the side of such economists as Alan Kirman and Frank Hahn & Robert Solow.)

Colander discusses how mainstream economists are indoctrinated. Colander recommends that peer review for grants from the National Science Foundation for economics research include, "for example, physicists, mathematician[s], statisticans, and even business and govermental representatives".

This bit about the NSF reminds me of a story Paul Davidson tells:
"In 1980 I applied for a grant from the National Science Foundation to write International Money and the Real World... One of the [insider peer reviewers] had the most telling observation of them all. He said something like, 'It is true that Davidson has a very good track record and surprisingly good publications, but he marches to a different drummer. If he's marching to a different drummer, if his music is different, then he ought to get his own money and not use ours.'" -- Paul Davidson in J. E. King, Conversations with Post Keynesians (1995)
Davidson did not get the grant.

Videos And Papers From 50th Anniversary Conference On Sraffa's Book


In comments on my previous post, a blogger from Revista Circus links to a presentation of Gary Mongiovi on Marxian exploitation. This is too modest. The blog has organized a plethora of videos, abstracts, and draft papers from the recently completed international conference in Rome on Sraffa's Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities:
  • Pierangelo Garegnani's presentation and a paper on the present state of the capital controversy
  • Fabio Petri's paper and presentation on bringing sense back to the theory of aggregate investment
  • Franklin Serrano's presentation on elements of continuity and change in the international economic order: an analysis based on the modern classical surplus approach
  • Gary Mongiovi's paper and presentation on the concept of exploitation in Marxian economics
  • Heinz Kurz's paper and presentation on reviving the "Standpoint of the old classical economists": Piero Sraffa's contribution to political economy
  • Tony Aspromourgos' paper and presentation on Sraffa's system in relation to some main currents in unorthodox economics
  • Marc Lavoie's paper and presentation on should Sraffian economics be dropped out of the post-Keynesian school?
  • Esteban Pérez Caldentey and Matías Vernengo's paper and presentation on Raúl Prebisch's evolving views on the business cycle and money
  • Roberto Ciccone's presentation on public debt and the determination of output
  • Antonella Palumbo's presentation on potential output, actual output and demand-led growth
  • Heinz Kurz's closing remarks

Update: In the comments, Saverio Fratini informs us that all the available papers are accessible from the conference web site.

Don't Say "There Must Be Something Common, Or They Would Not Be Called 'Games'"

1.0 Introduction
Von Neumann and Morgenstern posed a mathematical problem in 1944: Does every game have a solution, where a solution is defined in their sense? W. F. Lucas solved this problem in 1967. Not all games have such a solution. (It is known that such a solution need not be unique. In fact, the solution to the three person game I use below to illustrate the Von Neumann and Morgenstern solution is not unique.)

I may sometime in the future try to explain the game with ten players Lucas presents as a counterexample, assuming I can grasp it better than I do now. With this post, I try to explain some concepts of cooperative game theory so as to have this post for reference when and if I do. The Nash equilibrium and refinements are notions from the different theory of non-cooperative game theory.

2.0 Definition of a Game
Roughly, a game is specified by:
  • The number of players
  • The strategies available for each player
  • The payoffs to each player for each combination of player strategies
How a strategy is described depends on the specification of the game - whether it is in extensive form, normal form, or characteristic function form. Von Neumann and Morgenstern hoped that all three forms would be equivalent, with less data needing to be specified in the later forms in this series. This hope has arguably not worked out.

2.1 Extensive Form
A game in extensive form is specified as a tree. This is most easily seen for board games, like backgammon or chess. Each node in the tree is a board position, with the root of the tree corresponding to the initial position.

The specification of a node includes which player is to move next, as well as the board position. Each possible move the player whose turn it is can make is shown by a link leading from the node to a node for the board position after that choice of a move. Random moves are specified as moves made by a fictitious player, who might be named "Mother Nature". The roll of a pair of dice or the deal of a randomly selected card are examples of random moves. With a random move, the probability of each move is specified along the line connecting one node to another. Since a move by an actual player is freely chosen, the probabilities of any move by an actual player are not specified in the specification of a game.

The above description of the specification of a game cannot yet handle games like poker. In poker, not every player knows every card that is dealt. Von Neumann and Morgenstern introduce the concept of "information sets" to allow one to specify that, for instance, a player only knows all the cards in his hands and, perhaps, some of the cards in the other players' hands. An information set at a node, specifies for the player whose turn it is, which of the previous choices of moves in the game he has knowledge of. That is, an information set is a subset of the set of links in the tree leading from the initial position to the current node position. Since some of these moves were random, this specification allows for the dealing of hands of cards, for example.

The final element in this specification of a game occurs at the leaves of the tree. These are the final positions in the games. Leaves have assigned the values of the payouts to each player in the game.

It is easy to see how to define a player's strategy with this specification of a game. A strategy states the player's choice of a move at each node in the game denoting a position in which it is the player's move. A play of the game consists of each player specifying their strategy and the random selection of a choice from the specified probability distributions at each node at which a random move is chosen. These strategies and the random moves determine the leaf at which the game terminates. And one can then see the payouts to all players for the play.

One can get rid of the randomness, in some sense, by considering an infinite number of plays of the game for each combination of players' strategies. This will result in a probability distribution for payouts. The assumption is that each player is interested in the expected value, that is, the mean payout, to be calculated from this probability distribution. (All these descriptions of calculations have abstracted from time and space computational constraints.)

2.2 Normal Form
One abstracts from the sequence of moves and from random moves in specifying a game in normal form. The extensive form allows for the definition of strategies for each player, and each strategy can be assigned an arbitrary label. A game in normal form consists of a grid or table. A player's strategies are listed along one dimension of the table, and each dimension corresponds to a player. Each entry in the table consists of a ordered tuple, where the elements of the tuple are the expected payouts to the players for the specified combination of strategies.

Table 1 shows a simple example - the children's game, "Rock, Paper, Scissors." The rules specify the winner. Rock crushes scissors, scissors cut paper, and paper covers rock. This is a two-person zero-sum game. The payouts are shown in the table for the player whose strategies are listed for each row to the left. The payouts to the column player are, in this case, the additive inverse of the table entries.

Table 1: Rock, Paper, Scissors
RockScissorsPaper
Rock0+1-1
Scissors-10+1
Paper+1-10

By symmetry, no pure strategy in Rock, Paper, Scissors is better than any other. A mixed strategy is formed for a player by assigning probabilities to each of that player's pure strategies. Probabilities due to states of nature are removed in the analysis of games by taking mathematical expectations. But probabilities reappear from rational strategization. I also found interesting Von Neumann and Morgenstern's analysis of an idealized form of poker. One wants one's bluffs to be called in bluffing on occasion so that players will be willing to add more to the pot when one raises on a good hand.

Each player's best mixed strategy in a two-person zero-sum game can be found by solving a Linear Program (LP). Let p1, p2, and p3 be the probabilities that the row player in Table 1 chooses strategies Rock, Scissors, and Paper, respectively. The value of the game to the row player is v. The row player's LP is:
Choose p1, p2, p3, v
To Maximize v
Such that
-p2 + p3v
p1 - p3v
-p1 + p2v
p1 + p2 + p3 = 1
p1 ≥ 0, p2 ≥ 0, p3 ≥ 0
The interest of the column player is to minimize the payout to the row player. The left-hand sides of the first three constraints show the expected value to the row player when the column player plays Rock, Scissors, and Paper, respectively. That is, the coefficients by which the probabilities are multiplied in these constraints come from the columns in Table 1. Given knowledge of the solution probabilities, the column player can guarantee the value of the game does not exceed these expected values by choosing the corresponding column strategy. That is, the column player chooses a pure strategy to minimize the expected payout to the row player.

The column player's LP is the dual of the above LP. As a corollary of duality theory in Linear Programming, a minimax solution exists for all two-person zero-sum games. This existence is needed for the definition of the characteristic function form of a game.

2.3 Characteristic Function Form
The characteristic function form of a game is defined in terms of coalitions of players. An n-person game is reduced to a two-person game, where the "players" consist of a coalition of true players and the remaining players outside the coalition. The characteristic function for a game is the value of the corresponding two-person zero-sum game for each coalition of players. The characteristic function form of the game specifies the characteristic function.

As an illustration, Von Neumann and Morgenstern specify the three-person game in Table 2. In this game, coalitions of exactly two people win a unit.

Table 2: Canonical Three Person Game
CoalitionValue
{ }v( { } ) = 0
{1}v( {1} ) = -1
{2}v( {2} ) = -1
{3}v( {3} ) = -1
{1, 2}v( {1, 2} ) = 1
{1, 3}v( {1, 3} ) = 1
{2, 3}v( {2, 3} ) = 1
{1, 2, 3}v( {1, 2, 3} ) = 0

3.0 A Solution Concept

Definition: An imputation for an n-person game is an n-tuple (a1, a2, ..., an) such that:
  • For all players i, the payout to that player in the imputation does not fall below the amount that that player can obtain without the cooperation of any other player. That is, aiv( {i} ).
  • The total in the imputation of the payouts over all players is the payout v( {1, 2, ..., n} ) to the coalition consisting of all players.

Definition: An imputation a = (a1, a2, ..., an) dominates another imputation b = (b1, b2, ..., bn) if and only if there exists a set of players S such that:
  • S is a subset of {1, 2, ..., n}
  • S is not empty
  • The total in the imputation a of the payouts over all players in S does not exceed the payout v( S ) to the coalition consisting of those players
  • For all players i in S, the payouts ai in a strictly exceed the payouts bi in b

Definition: A set of imputations is a solution (also known as a Von Neumann and Morgenstern solution or a stable set solution) to a game with characteristic function v( ) if and only if:
  • No imputation in the solution is dominated by another imputation in the solution
  • All imputations outside the solution are dominated by some imputation in the solution

Notice that an imputation in a stable set solution can be dominated by some imputation outside the solution. The following set of three imputations is a solution to the three-person zero-sum game in Table 2:
{(-1, 1/2, 1/2), (1/2, -1, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2, -1)}
This solution is constructed by considering all two-person coalitions. In each imputation in the solution, the payouts to the winning coalition are evenly divided.

The above is not the only solution to this game. An uncountably infinite number of solutions exist. Another solution is the following uncountable set of imputations:
{(a, 1 - a, -1) | -1 ≤ a ≤ 2}
This solution can be understood in at least two ways:
  • Player 3 is being discriminated against.
  • The above is a solution to the two-person, non-constant game with the characteristic function in Table 3. A fictitious third player has been appended to allow the game to be analyzed as a three-person zero-sum game.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern present both interpretations.

Table 3: A Two-Person Game With Variable Sum
CoalitionValue
{ }v( { } ) = 0
{1}v( {1} ) = -1
{2}v( {2} ) = -1
{1, 2}v( {1, 2} ) = 1

The above has defined the Von Neumann and Morgenstern solution to a game. Mathematicians have defined at least one other solution concept to a cooperative game, the core, in which no imputation in the solution set is dominated by any other imputation. I'm not sure I consider the Shapley value as a solution concept, although it does have the structure, I guess, of an imputation.

References
  • W. F. Lucas, "A Game With No Solution", Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, V. 74, N. 2 (March 1968): 237-239
  • John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press (1944, 1947, 1953)

Weird Science II

A bit from Avatar reminds me of Ursula K. LeGuin's "Vaster Than Empires and More Slow", a short story republished in her collection The Wind's Twelve Quarters (1975). LeGuin postulates a world in which nodes in tree roots act like synapses. The plant life is one sentience. Maybe even vines and spores partake in it. As before, a cultural work reminds me of some science:
  • The longest lived thing is arguably Pando, a grove of aspens in Utah that seems to be one plant, connected at the roots and propagating through runners like strawberries or mrytle.
  • Or maybe it is an instance of the fungus Armillaria bulbosa in Oregon.
A Wikipedia article lists other such organisms, for what it's worth. (The references in this post are reminders for me to look up sometime.)

History Is A Nightmare From Which I Am Trying To Awake

Last year I bought my 12-year-old niece a novel. My sister-in-law says that as far as books goes, my niece likes memoirs and history, like The Diary of Anne Frank. I ended up buying my niece something other than a book. But I wonder what would be a good book to buy my niece.

I presented this to the salesperson at Barnes and Noble as, "Suggest a book like the Diary... about a girl growing up in troubled circumstances. She suggested Smashed: Story of a Drunken Girlhood. This does not seem a good answer to me. I haven't read Zailckas' book. From a review, I know she went to Syracuse University, and, for some reason, I think she may be a product of the Syracuse creative writing program. I have a vague impression that that program is quite good. The authors I associate with it write well about drunkenness and drugs.

I could always loan my niece a book from my collection. Perhaps my niece would like Eric Hobsbawm's The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991. I find the Russian names in Hope Against Hope confusing, even with the translator's or editor's appendix. Likewise, I think Antonio Gramsci's Letters from Prison is not understandable without quite a bit of knowledge of the historical setting. I seem to have mislaid my copy of Biko. I just bought The Mascot: Unraveling the Mystery of My Jewish Father's Nazi Boyhood and will not lend that away until I have read it.

I've loaned my copy of A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier to a young friend of mine. This was his choice in a selection I thought of after he told me about a somewhat autistic kid in his class: "He's even better at math than I am." I think I talked him out of The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night Time by trying to explain the concept of a unreliable narrator. I don't seem to be able to sell Life As We Know It: A Father, A Family, And An Exceptional Child, including to my sister, who has children and a degree from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

A salesperson at Borders suggested Zlata's Diary: A Child's Life in Wartime Sarajevo. A librarian in Rome, NY, suggested Four Girls From Berlin: A Ture Story of a Friendship That Defied the Holocause and two novels: The Devil's Arithmetic and The Diary of Pelly D. Come to think of it, isn't the Speilberg film, The Empire of the Sun, based on a memoir?

Does anybody have any comments on any of the above books or any further suggestions?

Jeopardy!

The answer for 42-across in today's New York Times crossword puzzle is "Larry Summers". What do you think the clue should be? Will Shortz, the puzzle editor and an institution, is content with "Former president of Harvard". I think being former secretary of the treasury is more impressive, myself.

Rich Man Wanna Be King, And A King Ain't Satisfied 'Til He Rules Everything

I have a series of posts on the distribution of income, the distribution of wealth, income mobility, and related matters. I don't know Lane Kenworthy's work, but his blog, "Consider the Evidence", looks interesting. He describes himself as "a social scientist who studies causes and consequences of poverty, inequality, employment, mobility, economic growth, and social policy. [He] focus[es] mainly on the United States and other affluent countries."

Keynes' General Theory As A Long Period Theory

The following paragraph appears in Chapter 5 of The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money:
"If we suppose a state of expectation to continue for a sufficient length of time for the effect on employment to have worked itself out so completely that there is, broadly speaking, no piece of employment going on which would not have taken place if the new expectation had always existed, the steady level of employment thus attained may be called the long-period employment corresponding to that state of expectation. It follows that, although expectations may change so frequently that the actual level of employment has never had time to reach the long-period employment corresponding to the existing state of expectation, nevertheless every state of expectation has its definite corresponding level of long-period employment."
It seems to me that this passage is important in an interpretation of Keynes as claiming that his theory applies in both the long and short periods. Even if the capital equipment in the economy were adjusted to effective demand, Keynes claims, the labor force need not be fully employed.

I think this reading is strengthened by a couple of considerations. One should distinguish between the full utilization of capital equipment and full employment. Distinguishing between these concepts makes most sense if one has dropped the idea of substitution between capital and labor. Likewise, one should drop the idea that the (long run) interest rate equilibrates savings and investment. But the dropping of these ideas is one result of the Cambridge Capital Controversies. On the other hand, it is not clear that Sraffa accepted Keynes' Chapter 17, another important locus for a long period interpretation of Keynes' General Theory.

I conclude with a couple of important Sraffian references on this issue. I could probably find some more recent. But I think Milgate (1982) and Eatwell and Milgate (1983) are key texts in this controversial area (even though I haven't read them in years).

Reference
  • John Eatwell and Murray Milgate (editors) (1983) Keynes's Economics and the Theory of Value and Distribution, Duckworth
  • Murray Milgate (1982) Capital and Employment: A Study of Keynes's Economics, Academic Press

More To Read

Apparently, Andrew Trigg has written a book Marxian Reproduction Schema: Money and Aggregate Demand in a Capitalist Economy (Routledge, 2006) on the topics of my post. He relates Marx's schemes for simple and expanded reproduction to Keynes' theory of effective demand, Kalecki's idea that capitalists "get what they spend", input-output analysis, and post-war growth models. At least a chapter discusses money and finance in this approach, including circuitist models. In my exposition, I put aside the labor theory of value. Trigg, on the other hand, discusses the transformation problem and whether or not a tendency exists for the rate of profit to decline.

I don't know if I'll purchase this book. Mike Beggs should be interested in it.