Qualms On Foreign Trade

"7.5. The idea that the opening of foreign trade bears a close resemblance to technical progress, in that in both cases additional processes of production are made available to the economy, is clearly expressed in Ricardo's Principles in the chapter 'On Foreign Trade'... Ricardo in fact compares the extension of trade to improvements in machinery, and, taking the real wage rate as given, investigates whether trade or improved machinery will have an impact on the general rate of profit. He concludes that if 'by the extension of foreign trade, or by improvements in machinery, the food and necessaries of the labourer can be brought to market at a reduced price, profits will rise,' whereas 'if the commodities obtained at a cheaper rate... be exclusively the commodities consumed by the rich, no alteration will take place in the rate of profits'...

7.6. In recent years the pure theory of trade has been reformulated, using a 'classical' approach to the theory of value and distribution and paying special attention to the fact that capital consists of produced means of production. A start was made by Parrinello (1970), followed by several contributions by Steedman, Metcalfe and Steedman, and Mainwaring... It was shown that several of the traditional trade theorems, derived within the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, do not carry over to a framework with a positive rate of profit (interest) and produced inputs (capital goods). (As is well known, the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of international trade assumes two countries producing the same two commodities by means of the same constant returns to scale technology, using the same two primary inputs, each of which is taken to be homogeneous across countries.) With a positive rate of interest that is uniform across countries some, though not all, of the standard theorems are undermined (including the 'factor price equalization theorem'), while with different rates of interest in different countries all standard theorems except the Rybczynski theorem turn out to be untenable. The 'gains' from trade for the single small open economy need not be positive. When in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory one of the two primary factors (land) is replaced by a factor called 'capital', the 'quantity' of which is represented in terms of a given total value of capital, then the theory is deprived of its logical coherence..." -- Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori, Theory of Production: A Long-Period Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

P.S. Some mainstream economists have recently expressed doubts about the empirical ability of the theory of comparative advantage and its use as a basis for policy. One can add Paul Krugman to the doubters.

Hoisted From Comments: Query On Foreign Trade

A reader asks:

"This is an unrelated discussion, but I was hoping that maybe you (or someone else reading this forum) could help me with a question that may also be of interest to you.

How does a standard neo-Walrasian CGE (computational general equilibrium) model predict economic losses from trade liberalisation?

I understand the logic behind the two goods and country case where welfare gains can be made through the elimination of trade barriers if there exists a comparative advantage (assuming the standard assumptions of perfect competition, constant returns to scale etc.), but how does the logic work with more than two countries and goods?

Is the answer simply that those countries which do not have a comparative advantage (in any or critical goods), experience welfare losses, because they are now importing more (due to lower prices abroad) and exporting less (trade is being diverted to other countries)?

Most (if not all) countries when getting the CGE treatment with full liberalisation scenarios, seem to make welfare gains. Is this because most countries have at least some comparative advantage in some goods, and the theory neglects any adjustment and transaction costs?

Some background on this question: I'm not an economist by trade, but rather study development studies, for which I'm writing a Master's Thesis. My strategy has been to use the Lakatosian methodological framework for studying the hardcore assumptions behind general equilibrium analysis. This has led me to study for example Keen's work, and Fabio Petri's (on the capital controversies) among others. Since I'm not concentrating on heuristics (and I'm not particularly mathematically inclined), I'm not familiar with all the implications of the standar neo-Walrasian theory (e.g. Arrow-Debreu) that the criticism, quite rightly it seems, is able to destroy by attacking its inconsistent or absurdly narrowed assumptions. To the standard unacquainted reader (for example my supervisor) it is however perhaps not only enough to attack the assumptions, but also be able to reduce the theory via its implications. I'm thinking that for a conclusion, I could write up a kind of characterisation of what the theory implies in the narrow sense and a wish list of what problems a perfect economic theory would be able to cover and account for as a contrast (perhaps a distant dream, but why not?)

Any ideas on the above would be appreciated.."

I don't know much about CGE models. I understand that commodities can be indexed in the Arrow-Debreu model on space, and this provides a theory of foreign trade. In the Arrow-Debreu model, the initial endowments of all commodities are taken as given data. This makes it a very short run theory. I was under the impression that the traditional argument about comparative advantage takes place in the Heckscher Ohlin Samuelson (HOS) model, which is a long run model.

Given the presence of produced capital goods and a positive interest rate, many supposed theorems in the HOS model are simply incorrect. In particular, trade according to the pattern of comparative advantage can move a country's Production Possibilities Frontier inward. Ian Steedman is a good author to read here. Perhaps your university library has a copy of the New Palgrave, and Steedman wrote the entry on "Foreign Trade". (I talked to Keen about these ideas before the publication of his book. He said that if he writes another edition, he might put in a chapter on foreign trade.)

I don't think comparative advantage explains the pattern of trade. A theory based on the Keynesian multiplier is another possibility. Literature here includes Luigi Pasinetti's Structural Economic Dynamics: A Theory of the Economic Consequences of Human Learning (Cambridge, 1993). Paul Davidson has proposed some reforms of the international monetary system. I have not read Ha-Joon Chang, neither his Bad Samaritans nor his Kicking Away the Ladder.

Two PDFs that I have downloaded from somewhere or other in the past year and have never got around to reading might be of interest. I am talking about Roberto Mangabeira Unger's Free Trade Reimagined and Robert Driskill's "Deconstructing the Argument for Free Trade".

Another body of literature that I have never explored is new trade theory, as presented by Paul Krugman. Given that comparative advantage fails to justify free trade, I don't see the point of that theory. As I understand it, new trade theory asserts incorrectly that comparative advantage would provide this justification if it were not for increasing returns or oligopoly or something. According to Barkley Rosser (in a 1996 book review in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization), Krugman claims more originality for his presentation than can be justified.

Applied Sraffianism

"These allusions give incidentally some indication of the disproportionate length of time over which so short a work has been in preparation... As was only natural during such a time period, others have from time to time independently taken up points of view which are similar to one or the other adopted in this paper and have developed them further or in different directions from those pursued here." -- Piero Sraffa

Despite my appreciation of Bliss' 1975 book, I think the following view dubious, uninformed, and authoritarian:

"A striking feature of the school to which Piero Garegnani belongs is its seeming lack of interest in the real world... Our world is changing rapidly and in ways that demand economic analysis of what is happening... Over the last 30 years so-called neoclassical economics has been extraordinarily productive... What has been the contribution of the post-Sraffa school in the same period? Nothing at all as far as I can see. This has been an exceptionally sterile approach. Where are the new ideas? Where are the illuminating insights into what is happening today?" -- Christopher Bliss (2009)

I have no problem with a researcher deciding to center their investigations into criticism and the history of economic thought. I think that when Bliss calls neoclassical economics "extraordinarily productive", he includes research that fails to test neoclassical economics and whose relationship to neoclassical economics can be doubted. Sraffian economics can easily exceed this standard.

I take the "others" Sraffa refers to above to be principally Wassily Leontief and John Von Neumann. So, for example, work with Leontief's Input-Output (I/O) analysis is applied Sraffian analysis. Interestingly enough, countries maintain their national accounts in a form supporting I/O analysis. (For the United States, see the benchmark input-output accounts available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For many developed countries, see the Structural Analysis (STAN) Database for data on Industry and Services available from the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).) For me, challenges in working with this data arise from statistical discrepancies, rectangular matrices that I expect to be square, components in value added that are neither wages nor profits, import and export flows, etc. But other economists, including some Sraffians have addressed these challenges in their own work.

I have listed selected applied Sraffa work on two topics.. Tony Aspromourgos (2004) lists Sraffian research applied to a larger range of issues.

References

• Tony Aspromourgos (2004). "Sraffian Research Programmes and Unorthodox Economics", Review of Political Economy, V. 16, n. 2: pp. 179-206.
• Christopher Bliss (2009). "Comment on 'Capital in Neoclassical Theory: Some Notes' by Professor Piero Garegnani".
• Thijs ten Raa (2006). The Economics of Input-Output Analysis, Cambridge University Press.
• John Von Neumann (1945). "A Model of General Economic Equilibrium", Review of Economic Studies, V. 13, N. 1: pp. 1-9.

A Prescient Passage From 1937

One can read Keynes as proposing an alternative theory of value. Hyman Minsky advances this reading to some extent. Classic texts for this reading include chapter 17 of the General Theory and Hugh Townshend's 1937 article on Keynes' book. The following passage is from the latter:

"... The following example ... I have made, for the sake of clarity, so extreme as to be absurd if taken literally. Imagine the community, during a given short period, to be all asleep, so that in this period neither exchange nor new production takes place, and prices must be supposed to remain where they were when business closed down the previous evening. Suppose that, on waking up the next morning and resuming business, all wealth-owners find that a fit of optimism about the (prospective) price of residential property has come over them. (I have taken this particular asset as typical of an asset having a high degree of durability, a long period of production and a low degree of substitutability, and am ignoring the complications due to the existence of various types of residential houses, selling at different prices and more or less inter-substitutable; that is to say, we assume only one kind of house available to live in or to deal in or to build.) Immediately the normal exchange of residential house-property resumes in the morning, there will be a sellers' market and the price will rise sharply. If we further assume the increase in liquidity-premium attaching to houses owing to the mental revaluations of owners and potential owners to be equal in all cases - that is, the change in opinion to be unanimous - no more and no less buying and selling will take place than on the day before. (More money will be required, other things being equal, to finance this volume of trade in houses at the higher price-level; we assume this to be forthcoming to all who want to deal, e.g. out of bank-loans.) If opinion is not unanimous, additional exchange of houses between the 'bulls' and the 'bears' will take place and will settle the price, but not in general at its former level; we assume for, the sake of the example, that the bulls preponderate, so that the price rises, the necessary money for the dealing, as before, being forthcoming. House-building will, of course, have become an abnormally profitable occupation; and in time the diversion of resources to this industry will come into play and will tend to readjust the relative prices of houses and of assets and people's expectations about them towards their former levels. But before it can do so completely, in general further (similar or opposite) spontaneous changes in the liquidity-premiums attaching to the existing houses will have taken place; obviously the physical production of new houses can never take place fast enough for its effect on prices to catch up with people's purely mental revaluations of existing ones. For the latter operate without any time-lag at all. Of course, in practice, the possibility or prospect of new production bringing down again the money-price of houses is present to people's minds, and operates to diminish optimism or to cause a wave of optimism to be followed by a wave of pessimism. (It is essential to the argument that people think in term of money-prices ...) But there is in fact no reason why new building should ever bring down the money-price of houses at all; if the price of building materials and/or labour is rising rapidly, the new production of houses may operate to reduce their relative price only, the prices of other valuables rising to the necessary degree - or, of course, intermediately to any extent. Or again, all prices may fall, that of houses more than others; or all prices may rise, that of houses less than others. The course of the actual money-price of houses is thus quite indeterminate, even in the shortest period, unless we know the course of the money-price of some one single or composite valuable (e.g. labour) - i.e. unless we have a 'convention of stability.' And, even so, the relative price, and therefore in spite of the convention of stability, the actual price of houses is still not precisely determined; it remains indeterminate to the extent to which it may be influenced by unknown changes in liquidity-preferences. This holds even in the shortest period." -- Hugh Townshend (1937) "Liquidity-Premium and the Theory of Value", Economic Journal, V. 47, N. 185 (March): pp. 157-169.

Townshend continues by considering this argument as valid for any durable asset, including monetary assets and equitities. He cites, as another example, cotton-mills in Lancashire during the 1920s. According to Townshend, cotton mills were being bought and sold, not with regard to "expectations about the price of cotton goods", but with the intent to "flip" them - to use the jargon of the recent U.S. housing market.

Parallel Thoughts By Wittgenstein And Sraffa

Apparently Wittgenstein wrote the following in 1937:

"The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop.

Language - I want to say - is a refinement, 'in the beginning was the deed'." -- Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Translated by Peter Winch) (1980)

And Sraffa, I guess, wrote the following in the early 1930s:

"If the rules of language can be constructed only by observation, there can never be any nonsense said. This identifies the cause and the meaning of a word.

The language of birds, as well as the language of metaphysicians can be interpreted consistently in this way.

It is only a matter of finding the occasion on which they say a thing, just as one finds the occasion on which they sneeze.

And if nonsense is 'a mere noise' it certainly must happen, as sneeze, when there is cause: how can this be distinguished from its meaning?

We should give up the generalities and take particular cases, from which we started. Take conditional propositions: whan are they nonsense, and when are they not?" -- Piero Sraffa as quoted by Heinz D. Kurz, "'If some people looked like elephants and others like cats, or fish...' On the difficulties of understanding each other: the case of Wittgenstein and Sraffa", The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, V. 16, n. 2 (2009): pp. 361-374

Anger Can Be Power

What I'm reading:

"The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks and police stations. In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier who are the official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression. In capitalist societies the educational system, whether lay or clerical, the structure of moral reflexes handed down from father to son, the exemplary honesty of workers who are given a medal after fifty years of good and loyal service, and the affection which springs from harmonious relations and good behavior - all these aesthetic expressions of respect for the established order serve to create around the exploited person an atmosphere of submission and of inhibition which lightens the task of policing considerably. In the capitalist countries a multitude of moral teachers, counselors and 'bewilderers' seperate the exploited from those in power. In the colonial countries, on the contrary, the policeman and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their frequent and direct action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle butts and napalm not to budge. It is obvious here that the agents of government speak the language of pure force. The intermediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide the domination; he shows them up and puts them into practice with the clear conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into the home and into the mind of the native." -- Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (1963).

Minsky Versus Sraffa

Kevin "Angus" Grier reminisces about Hyman Minsky's dislike for Piero Sraffa. But he doesn't recall points at issue. Minsky expressed his views in print:

"Given my interpretation of Keynes (Minsky, 1975, 1986) and my views of the problems that economists need to address as the twentieth century draws to a close, the substance of the papers in Eatwell and Milgate (1983) and the neoclassical synthesis are (1) equally irrelevant to the understanding of modern capitalist economies and (2) equally foreign to essential facets of Keynes's thought. It is more important for an economic theory to be relevant for an understanding of economies than for it to be true to the thought of Keynes, Sraffa, Ricardo, or Marx. The only significance Keynes's thought has in this context is that it contains the beginning of an economic theory that is especially relevant to understanding capitalist economies. This relevance is due to the monetary nature of Keynes's theory.

Modern capitalist economies are intensely financial. Money in these economies is endogenously determined as activity and asset holdings are financed and commitments of prior contracts are fulfilled. In truth, every economic unit can create money - this property is not restricted to banks. The main problem a 'money creator' faces is getting his money accepted...

...The title of this session, 'Sraffa and Keynes: Effective Demand in the Long Run', puzzles me. Sraffa says little or nothing about effective demand and Keynes's General Theory can be viewed as holding that the long run is not a fit subject for study. At the arid level of Sraffa, the Keynesian view that effective demand reflects financial and monetary variables has no meaning, for there is no monetary or financial system in Sraffa. At the concrete level of Keynes, the technical conditions of production, which are the essential constructs of Sraffa, are dominated by profit expectations and financing conditions." -- Hyman Minsky "Sraffa and Keynes: Effective Demand in the Long Run", in Essays of Piero Sraffa: Critical Perspectives on the Revival of Classical Theory (edited by Krishna Bharadwaj and Bertram Schefold), Unwin-Hyman (1990)

I gather, from second or third-hand accounts, that debates along these lines became quite acrimonious at the annual summer school in Trieste during the 1980s. I've always imagined Paul Davidson and Pierangelo Garegnani would be the most vocal advocates of the extremes in these debates. And I think of Jan Kregel, Edward Nell, and Luigi Pasinetti as being somewhere in the middle, going off in different directions. I don't know much about monetary circuit theory, but such theory may provide an approach to integrating money into Sraffianism.

Of course, Minsky's theories and Davidson's proposals for national and international reforms are of great contemporary relevance.

Wages, Employment Not Determined By Supply And Demand

1.0 Introduction
One theme of this blog is that the introductory textbook model of the labor market is incorrect. Two recent papers make this point from the perspective of institutional economics.

2.0 The Impossibility of a Perfectly Competitive Labour Market
The abstract of the first paper under consideration states:

Using the institutional theory of transaction costs, I demonstrate that the assumptions of the competitive labour market model are internally contradictory and lead to the conclusion that on purely theoretical grounds a perfectly competitive labour market is a logical impossibility. By extension, the familiar diagram of wage determination by supply and demand is also a logical impossibility and the neoclassical labour demand curve is not a well-defined construct. The reason is that the perfectly competitive market model presumes zero transaction costs and with zero transaction costs all labour is hired as independent contractors, implying that multi-person firms, the employment relationship and labour market disappear. With positive transaction costs, on the other hand, employment contracts are incomplete and the labour supply curve to the firm is upward sloping, again causing the labour demand curve to be ill-defined. As a result, theory suggests that wage rates are always and everywhere an amalgam of an administered and bargained price. -- Bruce E. Kaufman (2007). "The Impossibility of a Perfectly Competitive Labour Market", Cambridge Journal of Economics, V. 31: 775-787

Kaufman states that, "Institutional, post-Keynesian, radical and other heterodox economists have for many years expressed scepticism about the theoretical and empirical validity of the competitive model of labour markets." He cites the following literature:

• C. Kerr (1950). "Labour Markets: Their Character and Consequences", American Economic Review, V. 40 (May): 278-291
• G. Hodgson (1988). Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
• D. Vickers (1996). "The Market: The Tyranny of a Theoretical Construct", in Employment, Economic Growth, and the Tyranny of the Market, (ed. by P. Aretis), Brookfield: Edward Elgar
• W. Streeck (2005). "The Sociology of Labour Markets and Trade Unions", in The Handbook of Economic Sociology (ed. by N. Smelser and R. Swedberg), 2nd edition, New York: Russel Sage
• S. Fleetwood (2006). "Rethinking Labour Markets: A Critical-Realist-Socioeconomic Perspective, Capital & Class, V. 107 (Summer): 59-89

As far as I can tell, none of these papers are about the Cambridge Capital Controversy, which is the basis of my favorite critique of the introductory textbook model of labor markets.

3.0 Professor Lester and the Neoclassicals
The abstract of the second paper follows:

"This article revisits what is remembered as the 'Marginalist Controversy' in light of its immediate context and object: the substantial late 1940s increase in the federal minimum wage. Richard Lester's critique of 'marginalist theory,' and its implication that the minimum wage would be detrimental to labor was founded upon empirical studies and surveys that supported an Institutionalist conception of the business firm, the labor market, and economic policy. His disputants, Fritz Machlup and George Stigler, countered his points on the basis of what they took to be 'economic theory'. By any measure, including those of their own intellectual allies, Machlup and Stigler faired poorly. Interestingly, they are collectively remembered as having been triumphant in this debate. The essay suggests that what triumphed was not their arguments but rather the Neoclassical school of economics that Stigler represented." -- Robert E. Prasch (2007). "Professor Lester and the Neoclassicals: The 'Marginalist Controversy' and the Postwar Academic Debate Over Minimum Wage Legislation: 1945-1950", Journal of Economic Issues, V. 41, N. 3 (September): 809-826."

I had not known that the context of the debate about full cost pricing included minimum wage policies. Prasch makes the point that neoclassicals often misrepresent their position as a defense of economic theory, instead of as of a specific theory. In addition to drawing on a specific school of thought, Institutionalist economics, Lester had survey data supporting his position that the typical firm does not operate in a region of increasing marginal cost. It is this sort of data, which has been repeatedly replicated, that Milton Friedman argued, in his famous paper on positive economics, should be ignored.

"The Impossibility ... [Of] ... A Single Magnitude Representing ... The Quantity Of Capital"

Figure 1: From Sraffa's Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities

Suppose people save more. A neoclassical and Austrian school¹ idea is that then the supply of capital will have increased, in some sense. One would expect its price, the rate of interest, to be less, absent intervention by the monetary authorities. Entrepreneurs, if they were alert, would adopt more capital-intensive - that is - longer techniques of production. After these techniques came online, output per worker would be higher.

Suppose that the length of the period of production of a technique were defined in terms of purely physical data. Given a complete list of inputs and outputs, including the times at which they flow into and out of the production processes, one would be able to measure the (average) period of production of the technique composed of those processes. Then reswitching shows the above story cannot be universally valid.

Austrian-school economists and economists sympathetic to the Austrian school have had at least two reactions to this demonstration of the logical invalidity of the above story. One reaction is to assert that an aggregate measure of capital-intensity, such as a physical measure of the average period of production, is not needed for the story to go through. Supposedly, entrepreneurs shift resources, in response to low interest rates, to time periods further before the production of consumer goods. In the technical jargon, entrepreneurs tend to move resources towards producing goods of higher orders and away from producing goods of lower orders. I have shown² that this response fails to evade a critique based on reswitching.

The second reaction is to define the average period of production as dependent on the interest rate, as well as physical properties of techniques of production. Thus, the average period of production for a given technique will be different at the interest rates associated with different switch points. Apparently, Edmond Malinvaud, drawing on some work of J. R. Hicks, made this argument in a 2003 paper about Knut Wicksell's contributions. Saverio Fratini, in his paper presented at the recent 50th anniversary conference on Sraffa's book, took the opportunity of Malinvaud's paper to argue that this reaction also cannot be sustained as a response to a critique based on reswitching and capital-reversing.

I associate this second reaction with Leland Yeager, who, in a couple of papers in the late 1970s, argued that waiting has the dimensions of the product of value and time (for example, dollar-years). I find it hard to find a valid non-tautological argument here. I think Fratini's paper could be revised to point out that he refutes Yeager, as well as J. R. Hicks and Edmond Malinvaud. I would like to be referenced too, although I don't know about the conventions of referencing working papers.

Footnotes
¹ Both William Stanley Jevons and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk expounded this idea.
² Due to a recent hard-disk crash, I have lost originals from which I generated some PDFs, as well as reviewer comments on recent revisions.
References

• Saverio M. Fratini (2010). "The Hicks-Malinvaud Average Period of Production and 'Marginal Productivity': A Critical Assessment", Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities 1960-2010, Roma, Italy (2-4 Dec.)
• Robert L. Vienneau (2010) "Some Capital-Theoretic Fallacies in Garrison’s Exposition of Austrian Business Cycle Theory"
• Leland B. Yeager (1976). "Towards Understanding Some Paradoxes in Capital Theory", Economic Inquiry, V. 14: pp. 313-346
• Leland B. Yeager (1979). "Capital Paradoxes and the Concept of Waiting", Time, Uncertainty, and Disequilibrium: Exploration of Austrian Themes (ed. By Mario J. Rizzo), D. C. Heath and Company