For this we spend how much on intelligence?

Reading the recently declassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate on the global war on terror, I'm struck by how bland and predictable it all is. Anyone who's been paying attention to the news and reading the occasional blog entry or academic study on the subject could have come up with the following gems:

United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of
al-Qa’ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa’ida will continue to
pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist
organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement—which includes al-
Qa’ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells—is
spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.

Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body
of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists,
although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and
geographic dispersion.

Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority
nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such
progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the
vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa’ida,
could erode support for the jihadists.

We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global
strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-
American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose
and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.

The Iraq conflict has become the .cause celebre. for jihadists, breeding a deep
resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for
the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves,
and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry
on the fight.

Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1)
Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western
domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the
Iraq .jihad;. (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and
political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US
sentiment among most Muslims.all of which jihadists exploit.

We judge that most jihadist groups.both well-known and newly formed.will use
improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets to
implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct
sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a
potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.

and my favorite,

We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to
communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial
support.

Damn you, internet!